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The term “postmodern” may be understood as the cultural construction of reality in 
the midst of the modern. Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard depicted the postmodern above all 
as the collapse of modern metanarratives, especially that of progress. In contrast, 
Fredric Jameson outlined the postmodern as the culture of late capitalism, provid­
ing a convincing portrait of it as lacking in depth, stressing fragmentation, waning 
in affect, and resorting to a style of pastiche. Jameson also pointed to what he 
considered a disjuncture of space and the body, most notably in architecture, and 
what is often overlooked in accounts of his work, a certain reliance on technology 
(6). Since these writings of the late 1970s and early 1980s the postmodern thesis 
has undergone heavy criticism in some quarters but also fruitful integration into 
discourse in others. I shall resume the question of postmodern culture with particu­
lar attention to the relatively overlooked suggestion of Jameson that it bears a 
special relation to technology. I shall argue that American culture in the second half 
of the twentieth century may be seen as a series of turns toward some version of a 
postmodern culture in particular through its relation to information machines. The 
dissemination of these machines, beginning with television, introduces a mediation
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in the construction of cultural reality. They reconfigure the basic constituents of 
culture— the relation of the body to mind, human to non-human, space and time, 
subject and object.
After the trials of the Great Depression and World War II, Americans moved to the 
suburbs. Ensconced in attached and semi-attached single residence family homes, 
Americans pursued the virtues of middle-class life with a compulsive sense of 
determination. The deprivations, conflicts, and horrors of the 1930s and 1940s were 
left behind in favor of a single-minded, forward-looking gaze at a future of virtue. 
Americans, by and large, disavowed all the filth and evil of the earlier decades in a 
collective psychological embrace of the values of the heterosexual, white, private 
nuclear family. From the great collective actions of working class struggle and the 
New Deal in the 1930s and the sacrifices and commitments of the nation united in 
battle against fascism, Americans retreated into what they thought was the privacy 
of their homes. A vision of small town middle America in the style of Disneyland’s 
Main Street was transposed into the new tract homes cropping up like weeds 
across the continent.
If Americans needed any encouragement to withdraw from the public sphere, 
the nation-state and the economy gave them plenty. The state initiated an exten­
sive, paranoid campaign against communism, searching out and persecuting en­
emies everywhere, encouraging the digging of underground shelters, compelling 
schoolchildren to hide under desks during air raid exercises. Meanwhile, industri­
alists lobbied for the automobile, for building interstate highways, for destroying 
public transportation systems. They manufactured and promoted an array of do­
mestic appliances, filling all those suburban homes with time-saving and conve­
nient machines. With Europe busy recovering from war-time ravages, the U.S. 
flexed its political muscle across the globe, working out a cozy, if ideologically 
conflictual, arrangement with the Soviet Union that effectively divided the world 
and stabilized it against all comers. Within the “free” zone, American products, 
along with its ideology, prevailed.
But this rush back to a future of modern, suburban normalcy that had never 
existed included one aspect that would set American culture going in a decidedly 
new direction. The television set entered the living room of Americans at a truly 
breakneck pace: from 1948, when the first national programs were broadcast, until 
1955, a full 60% of homes included TVs. And by 1960, the figure rose to an amazing 
90% (Spigel). Unlike the earlier culture industries of film and radio, television 
promoted a culture in the home that dissolved the family values it was intended to 
secure and promoted as fostering. Film, by contrast, was a cultural event outside 
the home, very much like theater; and radio, at least in the popular imagination, 
appeared to amplify family togetherness and shared experience even though it 
commercialized family space (Douglas). Each in their own way, film and radio 
reinforced the boundary between the public and the private. Television, on the 
contrary, with its powerful combination of video and audio, inserted into American 
living rooms its own culture, the world of consumption, a space of signification and 
meaning that was neither private nor public. Perhaps because it emerged at a time
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of great economic abundance—even so characterized by John Kenneth Galbraith 
in The Affluent Society— television from the outset fostered consumerism. It did so 
with the crucial assistance of the Federal Communications Commission abetting 
national networks in their promotion of products for a national market (Browne). 
Relentlessly, network television disseminated the culture of its products in its ads, 
in the content of programs, and in the structure of its schedule. Into the work ethic 
of industrial American society entered the serpent of the consumer as hero/heroine 
and as a new subject position. Against the ideal of Promethean virility of the 
modern man came the impulsive, feminized identity of the consumer.1 Surely frag­
ments of a feminized consumer antedated the 1950s, as advertisers in the 1920s, for 
example, became aware that the person who did the shopping was female and their 
promotions needed to reflect that fact (Marchand). Even back in the later half of the 
nineteenth century soaps, hair lotions, and medicinal pills of all kinds entered the 
market enshrouded with publicity (Richards). Indeed, historians are not embar­
rassed to trace the origins of consumer society back to the eighteenth century 
(MeKendrick et al.). Yet a certain density of cultural practices awaited the dissemi­
nation of television into the home before the constitution of the subject as con­
sumer could occur.2
Culture theory from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s did not look with favor 
upon television. Solidly within a framework of high and low art, theorists desig­
nated television to the level of the mass and generally either disregarded it or 
treated it with contempt or dismay. This is true of all the leading theorists of the 
period: Lionel Trilling, Edmund Wilson, and Northrop Frye in literature; Clement 
Greenberg in art criticism; Seymour Martin Lipset in political science; Daniel Bell, 
William Whyte, and David Riesman in sociology. Riesman’s highly influential The 
Lonely Crowd painted a bleak portrait of the emerging suburban corporate culture, 
with television as one contribution to the scene. One might say that the apprecia­
tion of television by American theorists fit within the techno-phobic framework set 
forth by Jacques Ellul, whose condemnation of the new machines appeared in 
English in 1964. The lone figure to challenge the dominant position was of course 
Marshall McLuhan, a Canadian literary critic whose theory of the media outraged 
and repelled most academic and theoretical writers on popular culture. The Gutenberg 
Galaxy and Understanding Media brought a potential interest in television and 
the media more generally that might be difficult to disregard, though most managed 
quite successfully to continue to do just that.
The world of work structured a subject in a linear trajectory of the career, 
punctuated by days, weeks, months, and years with projects to be completed and 
paychecks that repeatedly closed the narrative of the life cycle. Industrial labor 
collaborated with the modern subject position as centered, rational, and autono­
mous. The media of print and film confirmed, deepened, and extended the modern 
subject as a coherent individual with stories that were completed, events that were 
explained, and a world that moved toward progress and betterment. The individual 
was an agent whose own life had a particular direction which could be harmonized 
with the direction of history. Encouraged and cajoled to leave their wartime occu­
pations, American women entered the suburban home to organize it and the lives of
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their children in a sexual division of labor that was constraining to be sure but also 
provided them a sense of connection with the modern. As alter egos to their 
husbands and as managers of the home women too might believe, as the dominant 
discourse insisted, that they were agents of history.
The structure and content of television introduced a new pattern into the lives 
of modern Americans in the 1950s. A continuous flow of images worked against the 
temporality of cultural objects as demarcated in time, and a continuous interruption 
of programs by commercials undermined the unity of the program (Williams). An 
imaginary geared to the aesthetics of coherence was punctured with regularity by 
fantasies of gratification through consumption (Houston). The linear narrative of 
Oedipal desire was displaced by a schizophrenic narrative of multiplicity, of frag­
mentary yearnings, opening the subject to less centralized patterns of identifica­
tion. The political economy of commercial network broadcasting introduced into 
the most privatized nuclear unit in history an outside, a mediatized public world 
with a post-Oedipal libidinal structure.
The content of ads as semiological constructs also worked against the grain of 
the modern subject and was also imbricated in the form of television media. Com­
mercials attached signifiers to signifieds, words and images to meanings, in a man­
ner at odds with the language of everyday life. Motivated to sell commodities, 
advertisers strove to transform the mundane pleasures of the product into more 
profoundly gratifying experiences. Ordinary objects were invested with desirable 
attributes that otherwise had no obvious relation to them. What could not be said 
about a product in face-to-face contact, at least with a straight face, could be 
depicted as such in the small space of the television screen. TV ads incited desire 
and solicited the viewer to a process of identification with the brand and the model, 
while simultaneously interpellating the subject as consumer. The culture of simula­
tions emerged in the privacy of the home just at the time when everyone thought 
they were safe and clean, middle-class and American, white and God-fearing. Be­
hind the back of the threat of communism, the modern subject was infiltrated by a 
postmodern culture of language and desire even more effectively than by Bolshe­
vism. If world politics were stabilized in detente, arms race, and Cold War, culture 
was being revolutionized in the micro-politics of the home.
In the 1970s the public sphere was animated by a new set of conflicts— the civil 
rights movement challenged racism; the anti-war movement challenged U.S. impe­
rialism; the feminist movement challenged patriarchy and sexism; the ecology move­
ment challenged the wastefulness of producers and consumers; the counter-cul­
ture challenged suburban utopias; the gay and lesbian movement challenged 
heterosexism. Altogether these new social movements brought an anti-authoritar- 
ian mood into the forefront of American political life. In the early 1970s, one might 
say, modern culture was reinvigorated by this frenzy of leftist activism. It appeared 
that history again was moving in a progressive direction, that structures of domina­
tion were being contested that previously had not occupied center stage in the 
political arena, that it was possible to find personal coherence in political agency— 
in short, that history made sense. A host of ideologies emerged which promoted
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the democratizing positions, and these were bolstered by the progress of 
decolonization and by the spread of socialist regimes in Europe.
The 1970s also saw the importation of European theories of culture that af­
forded new approaches foreclosed by the limitations of the dominant liberal frame­
works of the 1950s and 1960s. This sharp break with the ideas and trends of the 
earlier decades was effected by younger, less established people who had experi­
enced the heady politics of the New Left. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Euro­
pean theory became available for the first time since World War II. It was brought 
to the United States by graduate students and young academics in journals and 
book translations. Telos, Sub-stance, Semiotext(e), and New German Critique 
transformed the theoretical scene with major works by the Frankfurt school and 
French neo-Marxists, structuralists, and poststructuralists. Martin Jay’s Dialecti­
cal Imagination and my own Existential Marxism in Postwar France gave over­
views of perspectives on politics, society, and culture that initiated broad interest 
in continental thought. A rich debate began in the United States about contempo­
rary culture in which French and German thinkers were combined (such as Habermas 
and Baudrillard on communication theory), a mixture that did not exist on the con­
tinent, where the Rhine was an unsurpassable boundary. In this intellectual context 
a new type of thinking, “critical theory,” was born, which contributed greatly to 
opening new perspectives on culture and technology. At the same time British 
thought entered the American discussion most notably through the journal New 
Left Review, eventually introducing a left theory of the popular known as “cultural 
studies.” By the mid-1980s, cultural studies and critical theory combined with 
feminist, queer, and postcolonial theory in a complex articulation of approaches to 
culture.
The information machines that spread most numerously during these years 
were the photocopy machine, the fax machine, the audio cassette recorder, and the 
video cassette recorder. These technologies appeared also to foster a massive 
decentralization of information, putting into the hands of the ordinary individual 
the ability to produce copies of cultural objects. If the large world of politics shifted 
toward democracy in the 1970s, so the small world of the individual appeared also 
to empower people in a salutary, decidedly modern, direction. One could, for a 
relatively small amount of money, make or obtain copies of the major media—print, 
phonographs, radio and television broadcasts, prerecorded audio- and videotapes.
One other information machine began to enter the home in the 1970s: the 
telephone answering machine. This device also appeared to enhance the powers of 
the agent, the modern rational subject. No longer was the individual behaviorally 
conditioned, like a salivating dog, to the ring of the telephone. The machine could 
answer the call, recording the message on audiotape. But the machine also re­
sponded when its owner was not at home, introducing into daily life a new element 
of virtual presence. Radio and television extended the voice and image through 
space, affording remote presence. The tele-presence of the broadcast media moved 
sounds and images to the individual— they did not alter the individual’s presence 
in space so much as extend the ears and eyes, as McLuhan maintained, to distant 
locations (Understanding Media). The telephone enabled individuals to speak
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across distances covered by wires (and later radio signals), but again the caller or 
receiver was at a fixed point in space, one associated with a specific telephone 
number. The telephone answering machine, however, enabled the individual to 
receive an audio message as if they were at the location of the telephone number, 
but in fact might not be there. And with a remote retrieval system, one could hear 
the message on the tape from a distant location, now multiplying the position of the 
body in space. A similar effect is achieved on shopping channels when an indi­
vidual phones in and hears their voice coming from the television while they speak 
into the telephone. Or when someone phones a radio talk show and hears their 
voice coming from the radio while speaking into the phone. In these cases— which 
have become commonplace— the person occupies several positions at the same 
time. Such multiple positioning, one could argue, subverts the visual/aural body as 
a subject, as a definite point in Euclidean space from which perspective, in its 
Renaissance version, can be attained and stabilized. With these technologies, 
postmodern culture takes another step toward realization.
In the 1970s, the art world also witnessed the beginnings of the postmodern. 
Whatever anticipations there may have been in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the assault upon the high/low barrier in art may usefully be dated to the 
1970s. Rather than a high modernism that transgressed the forms of autonomous 
art, postmodern art registered the spread of information machines and the forma­
tion of the subject as consumer. Pop art, previously an oxymoron, explored the 
same aesthetics that television viewers experienced thousands of times a year. The 
commodity as object and the celebrity (the commodity as person) became the 
materials of aesthetic works. What was shocking to a modernist sensibility— for 
example, the presence of a work of Plato in an airport convenience store—was 
becoming commonplace as the markers of culture were drastically shifting and 
reforming (Marcuse). If modern cultural works derived their energy in part from 
their resistance to commodification and market principles (even though they were 
complicit with them if not absorbed by them), postmodern culture worked in and 
through the commodity as the locus of identification and subject construction.
At the level of discourse the shifting configuration of cultural formation was 
registered by poststructuralist theory. The term postmodern is an impossible one 
for poststructuralism and most of the major figures in this movement— from 
Baudrillard and Foucault to Derrida and Deleuze— refused it, as they did the term 
poststructuralism itself, by the way. The history of poststructuralism, in addition, 
is itself postmodern, as discourse traveled from France and to some extent from 
Germany, Italy, and England to the United States, becoming altered in the process 
but at the same time extended and expanded. Poststructuralism took the insight 
from Nietzsche that there was a need for a critique of values at the level of culture, 
as well as the insight from the structuralist linguists and anthropologists that the 
subject did not simply deploy language instrumentally as an enhancement of agency 
but was at the same time deployed by it, formed into cultural positions. In moder­
nity, Foucault and others contended, this position was that of the subject, the 
centered, autonomous, Oedipal agent. A cultural critique must then account for the 
process of this formation as a step in its possible, future reformation.
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The 1970s then saw an ambivalent movement both toward a renewed modern­
ist culture of the New Left and the new social movements and an opposite tendency 
in some information machines, in some art currents, and in poststructuralist theory. 
A richer articulation of the postmodern awaited the 1990s and the diffusion of 
digital information machines. At the theoretical level a concept of culture that 
overcame the high/low distinction was still lacking. Among critical theorists, even 
of the postmodern persuasion (like Lyotard and Jameson), a divide prevailed be­
tween literature and film on the one side and television on the other. Baudrillard 
was the exception to the general neglect of an anthropologically inspired under­
standing of culture, and the scorn with which he was regarded by other theorists 
proves this point. So does the belated recognition of the importance of the British 
cultural studies school. The dominant figures of theory in the 1970s—Jameson, 
Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Lacan— shied away from popular culture. But 
things would change by the late 1980s as a new generation of cultural theorists, 
men and women raised in front of the tube, would understand culture in a way that 
fostered an appreciation of technology. The old world sense of cultural depth that 
so marked Adorno and Horkheimer’s “The Culture Industry” began to appear irrel­
evant as mediated cultural objects drenched the landscape.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern European Communist States, and the 
reunification of Germany in 1989-1990 took the world, especially the United States, 
by surprise. The role of the media in these events was by no means negligible. In 
the long-term, the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and U.S. television and, in the 
short-term, the spread of information about the unfolding events from nation to 
nation both prepared and hastened the process of transformation. Some analysts 
have argued that the crumbling of the Soviet bureaucracy itself was in good part 
due to its policy of restricting information access, slowing the introduction of 
information machines from photocopiers to recordable VCRs and finally to comput­
ers (Castells). A top-down planned society cannot endure in an age of decentral­
ized information flows, this argument maintains. However one explains the fate of 
communism in the old world, it certainly upset the mental apple-cart in the new. The 
United States found itself without an enemy and in control of the world, not a good 
position for a nation with a forty year policy of paranoia. To be sure, the engine of 
ideology quickly produced new demons— Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists 
more generally— but this cultural creation had more the feel of a simulation than the 
earlier “evil empire.” Now, of course, the United States is back on track, with a 
dangerous enemy to be captured “alive or dead,” in the words of President George 
W. Bush. However, in the struggle against networked A1 Qaeda terrorists, the 
United States could not act alone and proceeded only with the agreement of a wide 
number of other nations. Globalization, it was revealed in the War in Afghanistan, 
had developed to the point where a planetary empire was emerging, a very different 
configuration of forces from that of the bi-polar Cold War (Hardt and Negri).
The events on other continents were by no means irrelevant to developments 
in the United States above all because of the rapid globalization of the world, if one 
may use that term, in the 1990s. In this decade economic and demographic global­
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ization were unprecedented. The mixing across the planet of corporate structure, 
work, finance, commodities, and people proceeded apace. While these trends 
certainly affected the emergence of postmodern culture, for reasons of space I shall 
restrict my analysis to yet another aspect of globalization that may be considered 
more immediately relevant to my topic: the birth and dissemination of networked 
computing.
The Internet installs a new kind of space, that of the virtual. It continues the 
tendency of mankind perhaps from the outset but certainly since print to duplicate 
reality, to create a second order of culture, one apart from the synchronous ex­
change of symbols and sounds between people in territorial space. Print, telegra­
phy, phonographs, film, radio, and television all enable mediated culture, the break­
ing up of the unity of time and space in the exchange of cultural objects between 
individuals and groups. But each of these technologies of information suffers from 
material constraints on their ability to violate phenomenological time and space. 
None of these media offer cultural objects everywhere and at any time. The process 
of the production and distribution of culture in these media operate within the 
domain of the analogue and within the logic of scarcity. Copying and storage are 
expensive and, in varying degrees, difficult. Great strides were made during this 
first media epoch to facilitate the multiplication of objects cheaply and democrati­
cally. From pirated printing in the seventeenth century to citizen band radio, pirate 
radio, and audio- and videocassette duplication in the twentieth, the control of 
analogue media has always been partial at best. Yet the analogue mode of informa­
tion lent itself to control by the modern institutions of the nation-state and the 
corporation.
The Internet combines a planetary, decentralized communication system (tele­
phone wires, communications satellites, radio frequencies) with digitized informa­
tion. Cultural objects are thereby shifted from a Newtonian, analogue regime to a 
quantum, digital regime. Copying, storage, and distribution are in principle costless, 
although pre-existing economic regimes may impose their costs just as Feudal toll 
collectors imposed costs on trade in the early period of capitalist commerce. The 
virtual order of cyberspace brings into proximity distant locations and implodes 
into instantaneity sequential events. The long-term cultural consequences of this 
innovation must be devastating for the modern, bearing in mind, however, a single 
but crucial caveat. No technology results in automatic consequences. All instru­
ments are subject to change in their structure by their users, even as they alter 
those users. To predict the birth of the postmodern as a result of the Internet is 
simply absurd. Yet one cannot ignore the potentials of the technology even as it 
evolves from a university-based research tool to a vast retail store and financial 
instrument to a tool of military institutions and governments to a warehouse of 
erotica to a pick-up spot.
The on-line individual is heavily mediated by the interface of globally net­
worked computers. This individual must know that his or her consciousness, 
cognition, and emotion are minuscule in comparison with what is at the other side 
of the screen. Just as the user is empowered by the tool of the Internet in a fully 
modern sense, so this user is also fragmented, dispersed, decentered, and
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marginalized by it in a fully postmodern sense. Like the consumer of the 1950s, the 
Internet user holds a position which is difficult to characterize as modern. The user 
as subject position is displaced from the privileged perch of res cogitans and 
brought within the rough domain of res extensa. At one with the network of wire 
tentacles and electronic pulses, the user is no longer a subject in the modern sense 
of the word, no longer one who stands under and controls the object. At best one 
might say that user and interface together form a new configuration of the subject, 
one characterized not by the overdetermination of its desires but by the 
underdetermination of its identity.
For the modern subject, identity is formed in the early years through the Oedi­
pus complex, bolted to the self at the unconscious, libidinal level. Once established 
as an ego, the individual rounds out the process of becoming a subject through its 
engagement with discursive regimes and ideological apparatuses starting with 
schooling. Interpellated by teachers as a student, the individual recognizes him/ 
herself through a maze of tests. During this process, subjectivation as rational 
autonomy is continually reinforced through assimilation into cultural figures of 
economic rationality, political citizenship, and the law’s “reasonable man.” Print 
media also function as a correlative to the discourses of subjectivation (Warner).
As we have seen, the cultural force of the modern subject begins to unravel in 
the 1950s with the practice of television viewing and the solicitation of individuals 
through the virtuality of the screen into the position of being consumers. The 
laser-like focus of Oedipal desire is replaced by the scattered longings for com­
modities. By the 1990s, with mediated culture in full hegemony and high/low dis­
tinctions obliterated, with the borders between producer and consumer in the do­
main of culture slowly eroding in favor of the digital user, the shattered remnants of 
the modern subject become barely visible on the horizon of culture. Instead, iden­
tity emerges as a construct. With the thick interface of networked computing, 
identity is no longer misrecognized in the mirror because there remains no body to 
reflect into it. Misrecognition becomes self-subjectivation. The user defines him/ 
herself in what can only be inauthenticity. The only origin to the user’s identity in 
cyberspace is the typed signs that perform its character. Identification only occurs 
in the screen and is lost as soon as the user turns back to real life.
Bits and pieces of the modern subject continue, even dominate, in cyberspace. 
Compulsive instrumentalism colors the spaces of stock trades and get-rich schemes. 
And users who mistake their consciousness for reality, who presume to create 
themselves, to form their own identities, enter the same ideological discourse as 
consumers who think they are fulfilled and free in their choice of commodities. 
These gestures of recognition tie networked computing to the modern, but they do 
so always at the cost of disavowing the machinic relation. If the user holds onto the 
link with the interface, reflexively examining the scene of subjectivation, a different 
interpretation becomes more likely. The assemblage of user-network is a cultural 
mechanism for restructuring the figure of the subject, one in which the process of 
cultural production and the process of subjectivation are concurrent, continuous, 
and unending. To the extent that networked computing becomes a discursive 
apparatus of this order, to the extent that the mediation it inscribes resembles even
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roughly this form, then something monstrous, something postmodern, is likely to 
emerge from it. It is difficult to say what precise shape this new postmodern culture 
is likely to take and it is truly hazardous to speculate about it. But surely new 
cultural forms are on the horizon that have networked computing as a condition of 
their emergence. This means that the medium of art will be digital; that its interface 
will be the screen; that its formation will include the possibility of collective produc­
tion; that its reception will include the possibility of its recreation; that its medium 
will be at once textual, aural, and visual; that its context will be global. Each of these 
features involves to a greater or lesser extent a break with earlier conditions. If 
Benjamin foresaw new possibilities for art with the introduction of the cinematic 
apparatus, surely the prospects for change are even greater for the work of art in the 
age of digital (re)production.
Throughout this essay I have unashamedly periodized. I have put things in their 
modern and postmodern places. This commonplace historical practice is of course 
completely at odds with a postmodern sensibility. The paradox of my essay is that 
the delineation of the postmodern can only occur through modern discursive prac­
tices. From a modernist perspective this fact is a performative contradiction, as 
Habermas would say. From a postmodernist stance, paradox is the condition of 
utterance.
Notes
1 This assertion is fundamental to the cultural study of television. It was introduced by 
Andreas Huyssen and Beverle Houston. See also Joyrich; Morse; Modleski.
2 See the persuasive study by George Lipsitz on the relation of the family, television, 
and consumerism.
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